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ABSTRACT 
 
 Justice Cardozo’s prescient inquiry in The Nature of the Judicial 
Process nearly a century ago merits revisiting and analysis in light of the 
present political climate. Under the new administration, the Executive 
Branch has characterized a judicial opinion from the U.S. District Court of 
Hawaii’s as emanating from “an island in the Pacific,” suggested the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals should be fragmented, and subjected judges who 
disagree with the constitutionality of the administration’s immigration 
policies to ridicule, vilification, or disparagement. When contemplating the 
nature of the judicial process, it is time to reassess the courts' systemic 
policymaking function in the constitutional system via checks and balances 
and separation of powers. This article, therefore, analyzes the principles of 
checks and balances, separation of powers, and the policymaking courts 
through the lens of complex systems analysis.  
 
The complex and systemic interactions between the courts, Congress, and 
the Executive Branch give rise to an intricate sociopolitical, legal, and 
economic system. In the present political context, a complex systems 
analysis reveals that the courts’ power to check, balance, and maintain the 
separation of powers is a legitimate and necessary exercise within the 
constitutional schema. Here, complex systems analysis is employed to 
explore how courts are acting properly when reviewing, checking, and 
balancing the power of the competing branches. Further, this analytical 
approach re-conceptualizes “judicial activism” as constitutional 
interpretation explicitly reflecting the policymaking role of the courts and 
their work to preserve the integrity of the constitutional system. From this 
perspective, the role of the courts can be viewed as policymaking not from 
any particular ideological position, but rather from the structural systemic 
values and norms that bind the constitutional order. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution is complex, because it functions as a text, 
legal ordering mechanism, expression of an historical moment, repository 
of ideology, and philosophy of government and governance. In its original 
and amended form, the Constitution sets out the structure of the federal 
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government,1 defines the authority of the federal and state governments,2 
and puts forth sundry constraints on the exercise of federal power.3 The 
Constitution also describes the relationship between the federal govern-
ment, state governments, and all persons subject to their respective jurisdic-
tions.4 Additionally, the plasticity of the text raises several issues that pave 
the way for the courts' interpretive enterprise of “finding” constitutional 
“truths,” and applying those truths to the U.S. polity.5 In 1921, Benjamin 
Cardozo asked, “Where does the judge find the law which he embodies in 
his judgment? . . . There are gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambigu-
ities to be cleared. There are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not 
avoided.”6  
Today, the Executive Branch is impinging upon the Judiciary's complex 
role of finding the law. Namely, the current Executive has sought to mini-
mize and circumvent the Judiciary’s power to check, balance, and uphold 
separation of powers.7 Recently, the Executive characterized the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of Hawaii’s judicial decree on the President's Executive Order 
banning immigration from several Muslim-majority countries as emanating 
from “an island in the Pacific.”8 Further, the Executive called for the frag-
mentation of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and ridiculed, vilified, and 
disparaged its judges that disagreed with the Administration’s immigration 
policies.9 With this in mind, it is timely to revisit the nature of the judicial 
                                               
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also id. at art. II § 1, cl. 1; id. at art. III, § 1. 
2 See id. at pmbl.; see also id. at art. IV § 4. 
3 See id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also id. at art. II § 3; id. § 1.  
4 See id. at art. IV, § 1; see also id. § 2, cl. 1; id. § 4. 
5 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803) (“The question whether a right has vested or 
not, is, in its nature, judicial.”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 
(1921). 
6 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 14. 
7 E.g., Evan Perez & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Fires Acting AG After She Declines to Defend Travel 
Ban, CNN (Jan. 31, 2017, 2:37 PM), www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/donald-trump-immigration-
order-department-of-justice/ (discussing the blocking of implementation of President Trump’s executive 
order on curbing immigration via a travel ban on targeted countries and then-acting Attorney General 
being relieved of her position after questioning the constitutionality of the president’s immigration exec-
utive orders); see Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Allows Parts of Travel Ban to Take Effect, CNN 
(June 27, 2017, 3:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/travel-ban-supreme-
court/index.html; see also Christian Farias, Court Temporarily Blocks Parts of Trump’s Syrian Refugee 
and Travel Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2017, 9:09 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/court-blocks-trump-refugee-ban_us_588d4b53e4b0b065cbbc6a6f.  
8 Charlie Savage, Jeff Sessions Dismisses Hawaii as ‘an Island in the Pacific’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/us/politics/jeff-sessions-judge-hawaii-pacific-island.html. 
9 See Amber Phillips, Trump Keeps Throwing Shade on the 9th Circuit. But He Probably Won’t Be Able 
to Break It Up., WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/04/28/can-trump-absolutely-break-up-a-federal-court-thats-standing-in-his-
way/?utm_term=.93040a9f30a6; see also Andrew Kaczynski, AG Sessions Says He’s ‘Amazed’ a Judge 
‘On an Island in the Pacific’ Can Block Trump’s Immigration Order, CNN (Apr. 21, 2017, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/politics/kfile-sessions-psychoanalyze/index.html; Jose A. DelReal & 
3
Astrada: The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017
Do Not Delete 4/29/18  8:45 AM 
266 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXI:iii 
process and its policymaking function in the American constitutional sys-
tem.10  
Additionally, it is timely to reevaluate the commonly accepted notion 
that public policy of the government is to be found in its statutes, and when 
they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and in the 
constant practice of the government officials; but when the lawmaking 
power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has constitutional 
power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts.11  
Furthermore, it may no longer behoove federal courts to declare courts 
can know nothing of public policy except from the Constitution and the 
laws, and the course of administration and decision. It has no legislative 
powers. It cannot amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine 
questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considera-
tions of that sort must, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions 
of policy determined there are concluded here.12  
Because the present Administration has shown a lack of respect for 
checks and balances and the separation of powers, it is time for honest judi-
cial opinions that embrace rather than eschew the systemic policymaking 
function of the courts.13  
In analyzing the role of judicial opinions as policy statements, and the 
power of the courts to check and balance as well as maintain separation of 
powers, it is important to appreciate “the role of law as a broker between 
the past and the future of social orders and the social functions of legal doc-
trine.”14 Since the Constitution’s inception as a meta-signifier (meaning-
granting) and signified (meaning-receiving) document, various actors have 
                                                                                                             
Katie Zezima, Trump’s Personal, Racially Tinged Attacks on Federal Judge Alarm Legal Experts, 
WASH. POST  (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/06/01/437ccae6-280b-
11e6-a3c4-0724e8e24f3f_story.html?utm_term=.95110959e31d; Olivia B. Waxman, The History Be-
hind President Trump’s Problem with the Ninth Circuit Court, TIME (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://time.com/4758187/donald-trump-ninth-circuit-history/. 
10 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Courts and President Trump’s Words, NEW YORKER (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-courts-and-president-trumps-words. 
11 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1896). 
12 License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 469 (1867). 
13 See Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 
(1976); Chris Cillizza, Trump’s Russia Statement Proves He Doesn’t Understand Separation of Powers, 
CNN (Aug. 2, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/trump-russia-
sanctions/index.html (discussing President Trump’s lack of understanding of checks and balances and 
separation of powers in his tweets stating “the opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes 
law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” and “just cannot believe 
a judge would put our country in such peril. If something happens blame him and court system. People 
pouring in. Bad!”). 
14 Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in Modern Law, 78 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 235, 242 (2015); see also CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 81. 
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put forth competing interpretations of the actual meaning and purpose of the 
Constitution.15 The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, as well as 
State governments have each vied for the power to expound constitutional 
truth at some point in the Constitution’s history.16 However, the federal 
courts have predominately produced a distinct constitutional discourse that 
proffers what has become accepted as the correct interpretation of the Con-
stitution.17 The evolution of constitutional meaning, the nature of the judi-
cial process, and the role of courts—particularly, the U.S. Supreme Court—
in shaping such meaning can be viewed from a systemic perspective. That 
is, the Constitution lays out a complex system wherein interpretation and 
meaning are situated and inform the nature of the judicial process. Further-
more, a systems analysis provides overarching coherence for judgment and 
principles of interpretation that orient the courts' role and power in regard to 
the other branches of government. What is more, the systemic and structural 
underpinnings of the order established in the original text of the Constitu-
tion and its amendments enshrine public policy prerogatives in the form of 
checks and balances ("CAB") and the separation of powers ("SOP") that 
serve to contour the interpretive enterprise.  
In light of the impact that the Constitution has on defining political, so-
cial, and economic realities in the U.S., this article examines the interpretive 
enterprise in the present political context using complex systems theory 
analysis. This analysis reveals the courts' inherent, legitimate, and necessary 
power to check, balance, and maintain the separation of powers, because 
complex systems “involve many components that adapt or learn as they in-
teract [and] are at the heart of important contemporary problems.”18 In turn, 
judicial activism can be re-conceptualized as a form of constitutional inter-
pretation that reflects the policymaking role of the courts. Further, CAB and 
SOP provide courts with “principles of selection . . . to guide [courts] 
among all the potential judgments that compete for recognition[,]” because 
                                               
15 See Winton U. Solberg, True Meaning: The Federalist and the Constitution, 16 REV. IN AM. HIST. 368 
(1988). 
16 See, e.g., Brian M. Feldman, Note, Evaluating Public Endorsement of the Weak and Strong Forms of 
Judicial Supremacy, 89 Vᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 979, 980 (2003); see also Paul E. McGreal, Ambition’s Playground, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1117–19 (2000). 
17 See Feldman, supra note 16, at 980–83; see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The 
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
239–41 (2002). 
18 John H. Holland, Studying Complex Adaptive Systems, 19 J. SYS. SCI. & COMPLEXITY 1 (2006); see, 
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (ruling that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment may not be used in state law criminal prosecutions in state courts or federal criminal law 
prosecutions in federal courts through selective incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due pro-
cess clause); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (ruling unanimously that the states are 
required under the Sixth Amendment to provide counsel in criminal cases for indigent defendants 
through selective incorporation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
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“[e]very judgment has a generative power. It begets in its own image.”19 
The courts’ power to effectuate “presumably desirable social objectives can 
. . . be reached through a departure from traditional modes of decision[,] but 
is not free from difficulty.”20 Because judicial opinions are a form of poli-
cymaking, this article asserts that a complex systems analysis addresses this 
difficulty. 
Part I discusses complex systems theory as an analytical tool for examin-
ing the Constitution and the role of the Judiciary. Part II then explores judi-
cial policymaking within the Constitution's complex system via checks and 
balances. Finally, part III explores the Judiciary's role within the system vis-
à-vis the other political branches, and ultimately concludes that the Judici-
ary functions not only to uphold the constitutional order founded on CAB 
and SOP, but also to actively participate within it. 
I. APPLYING THE COMPLEX SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
 A. Constitutional Interpretation as Public Policy 
The Constitution and its interpretation by the courts can be viewed as the 
expression of public policy pronouncements that the Founders believed 
should form the perpetual basis of the republic.21 Policy can be defined as 
government pronouncements backed by the financial and coercive power of 
the state to effectuate an interpretation of the social welfare.22 Policy entails 
a multi-agent generated process wherein the social welfare is conceptual-
ized, defined, and acted upon.23 Within this process, policy can be viewed as 
“considerations of what is expedient for the community,” according to Jus-
tice Holmes.24 Policy has “consistently, if not always explicitly, found au-
thority in peoples’ empirical perspectives about social consequences. Its 
most important contribution has perhaps been . . . that law is most fruitfully 
conceived as decision in the sense of sanctioned authoritative choice.”25 
                                               
19 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 21. 
20 Charles B. Nutting, Policy Making by the Supreme Court, 9 U. PITT. L. REV. 59, 72 (1947). 
21 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern 
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2000). 
22 See Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298 
(1972). 
23 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 35–36 (Paulo J.S. Pereira & Diego M. Bel-
tran eds., 2011) (1881). 
24 Id. at 35. 
25 Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362, 
372 (1971). 
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Policy is affected within the system and structure of the constitutional or-
der, and the law, as policy, is no exception.26   
The Constitution embodies a complex system within which public policy 
and social welfare are articulated and implemented. Philip Kurland writes, 
[The] Constitution itself [is] an expression of public policy. Just as with law . . . 
public policy may be divided into the two categories of the substantive and the 
procedural. And when one looks at the text of the Constitution, it is readily ap-
parent that the public policy expressed in it [as originally conceived] is essen-
tially procedural rather than substantive.27  
 
Yet the courts have found substance within procedure, and have inter-
preted the Constitution as policy accordingly, substantively and procedural-
ly.28 “We reach the land of mystery when constitution and statute are si-
lent,”29 Cardozo explains. It is in this space that systemic structural policy 
principles come into play when interpreting the Constitution. As the Court 
noted early on in its jurisprudence, “It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”30 Expansively viewing 
policymaking, the Court’s assertion is explicitly policy-based. That is, the 
federal courts’ assumption of the power to participate substantively in the 
tripartite order established by the Constitution is part of a complex system 
premised on enduring structural values of order and stability reflected in the 
cardinal principles of CAB and SOP. The foregoing are key systemic prin-
ciples that factor into the courts' interpretive calculus. 
B. Complex Systems Theory as an Analytical Tool 
On its face, systems analysis may seem too overly broad to produce clear 
conclusions about the nature of judicial interpretation and opinions. Indeed, 
because it is a natural scientific theory, it may appear as though it does not 
readily apply to the sociality of human affairs.31 However, as an analytical 
                                               
26 See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 10 (discussing how judges used President Trump’s campaign language to 
create the policy justification for overturning an executive order that would not have been overturned if 
issued by President Obama). 
27 Philip B. Kurland, Public Policy, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 181, 
182 (1985). 
28 Id. at 183 ("The lion’s share of the substantive policy-making function in the national government was 
assigned to the legislative branch, largely by article I, § 8, although provision was made for recommen-
dations to the legislature by the President in article II. There is no suggestion of a policy-making func-
tion for the judicial branch at all."). But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that 
the Constitution implies a fundamental right to privacy, and, thus, developing a distinct jurisprudence 
that confers a substantive dimension to the procedural constitution through opinions). 
29 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 18. 
30 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
31 See, e.g., Stephen Wolfram, Complex Systems Theory (Princeton Inst. for Advanced Stud. 1985), 
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framework and worldview, complex systems analysis does not necessarily 
fall into this explanatory quagmire despite no universally accepted defini-
tion of what constitutes a complex system.32 Theorists have generally de-
scribed complex systems as comprised of “systems that have a large num-
ber of components, often called agents, [which] interact and adapt or 
learn.”33 This basic description of complex systems informs the nature of the 
judicial process and policymaking in the constitutional order. As a complex 
system, agents or participants in the system are affected by interpretation of 
the Constitution’s provisions by the Judiciary either within the judicial pro-
cess or as an effect of judicial policymaking. Thus, it is fruitful to explore 
the notion that the courts possess policymaking capacity within the com-
plex, constitutional system. For example, constitutional interpretations from 
the Judiciary inform how the U.S. conducts domestic affairs and imple-
ments foreign policy, which in turn affects the domestic polity and foreign 
policy.34 
Additionally, systems analysis provides a way of evaluating interpretive 
outcomes in a constitutional context where "causation is complex."35 David 
Byrne observes, "Outcomes are determined not by single causes but by 
multiple causes, and the causes may, and usually do, interact, in a non-
additive fashion. [T]he combined effect is not necessarily the sum of the 
separate effects.”36  Furthermore, a systems analysis provides insight into 
constitutional order because  
system boundaries . . . are multiple, fluid and massively entangled, the ‘internal 
interactions’ happen at various scales and interlocking patterns emerge at vari-
ous places across the system and throughout the time period of the self-
organizing process. Clusters of agents form micro-patterns continually. The mi-
cro-patterns interact to form larger, more comprehensive patterns or disrupt 
each other during the on-going evolution of the  system. At the same time, 
emergent patterns in a super-system influence the emerging patterns in sub-
                                                                                                             
http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/complex-systems-theory.pdf. 
32 See Holland, supra note 18, at 6. 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding foreign terrorism suspects held at Guan-
tanamo Bay have the constitutional right to challenge their detention in federal courts); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding military commissions set up by the Administration to try de-
tainees at Guantanamo Bay are unconstitutional because they do not afford Geneva Convention and the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice protections); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding federal 
courts have authority to determine if foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully impris-
oned); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding detainees at Guantanamo Bay that are US citi-
zens must be accorded rights of due process and the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status 
before an impartial authority). 
35 DAVID BYRNE, COMPLEXITY THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (Routledge, 
1998). 
36 Id. 
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systems and in individual agents by either reinforcing or disrupting their  local 
self-organizing process.37  
As Bela Banathy notes, “system” refers to a configuration of individual 
parts connected and joined together by a web of interdependent relation-
ships as “elements in standing relationship.”38  In general, a system is thus 
composed of regularly interacting parts that give rise to systemic concepts 
and principles that impact the whole system and other individual actors 
within it.39 These concepts, whether political, legal, or philosophical, work 
in tandem within the system of organizational relationships, and develop the 
system’s “capacity to unify and rationalize.”40 As systemic or structural 
concepts, CAB and SOP facilitate agent engagement within the constitu-
tional order by enhancing the courts’ capacity to unify and rationalize con-
stitutional jurisprudence to preserve the integrity of the system as a whole. 
In this way, as expressions of policy, court opinions serve the system by 
maintaining the independence and interdependence of the three branches 
using CAB and SOP.  
Further, a systems perspective helps to contextualize complex judicial in-
terpretation as the Judiciary works to maintain the integrity of the overarch-
ing constitutional order as a whole despite being one of its key actors. A 
systems analysis enables clearer examination of cardinal constitutional con-
cepts, as well as their philosophical implications and logical conclusions.41 
A complex systems perspective provides additional insight into the judicial 
role and power in that systems can be defined in objective and subjective 
terms:  
    Subjectively, complex systems involve ‘unfamiliar . . . or unplanned and un-
expected sequences, either not visible or not immediately comprehensible’. In 
this respect, complexity tends to be identified by its relationships rather than by 
its constituent parts. Such distinction between objective and subjective defini-
tions implies that: (i) complex systems are not uniform—there are relationships 
of differing strengths between their components (and those with especially tight 
connections form sub-systems); and (ii) any components in the system can par-
ticipate in multiple sub-systems—so even ‘homogeneous components can sup-
port internal diversity through re-alignments of relationships to create non-
identical sub-subsystems.’42 
                                               
37 Kai E. Lehmann, Unfinished Transformation: The Three Phases of Complexity’s Emergence into In-
ternational Relations & Foreign Policy, 47 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 407 (2012). 
38 Bela Banathy, A Taste of Systemics, PRIMER PROJECT AT INT'L SOC'Y FOR THE SYS. SCI., 
http://www.isss.org/taste.html. 
39 Id. 
40 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 31. 
41 Id. at 37. 
42 Emilian Kavalski, The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International Relations Theory: 
Notes on the Application of Complexity Theory to the Study of International Life, 20 CAMBRIDGE REV. 
9
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Systems analysis posits that individual agents are the collective base el-
ements of the system that interact and adapt to interactions, which allows 
for innovation and maximization of the potential for the individual parts to 
evolve.43 It is important to underscore, as John H. Holland clarifies, that a 
complex system  
has no single governing equation, or rule, that controls the system. Instead, it 
has many distributed, interacting parts, with little or nothing in the way of a 
central control. Each of the parts is governed by its own rules. Each of these 
rules may participate in influencing  an outcome, and each may influence the 
actions of other parts. The resulting rule-based structure becomes grist for the 
evolutionary procedures that enable the system to adapt to its surroundings.44 
Thus, one can conceptualize a complex system as a “learning machine, 
one made up of semi-independent modules which work together to solve a 
problem."45 Howard Bloom continues, "Some complex adaptive systems, 
like rain forests, are biological. Others, like human economies, are social. . . 
. Both apply an algorithm—a working rule” that sets the foundation for in-
teraction.46 In this case, that algorithm includes CAB and SOP.  
Accordingly, complex systems are “complex,” because they are compo-
sites of diverse, interconnected parts, which adapt and learn through interac-
tion with other parts.47 Agents adapt to the shifting dynamics characteristic 
of a networked and integrated system.48 In the same way, judges adapt new 
ways of administering and interpreting the law within the constitutional sys-
tem.49 Thus, the multifarious nature of constitutional interpretation finds 
footing on algorithms and stabilizing principles such as CAB and SOP.50 
                                                                                                             
OF INT’L AFF. 436, 438 (2007). 
43 Id. 
44 See John H. Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems, 121 DAEDALUS 1, 21–22 (1992); see e.g., D&W 
Auto Supply v. Kentucky Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1980) (challenging the constitutional-
ity of the Litter Control Act, and holding that the Act is an appropriation act and, thus, is unconstitution-
al for failure to have received a vote of majority of all members elected to the House of Representa-
tives); Consumer Party of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 507 A.2d 323, 331–32 (1986), overruled by Pa. Against 
Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (holding that a party challenging 
the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly bears a heavy burden of proof, and legislation 
will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution). 
45 See e.g., HOWARD K. BLOOM, GLOBAL BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MASS MIND FROM THE BIG 
BANG TO THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2000); Holland, supra note 44, 17–18. 
46 BLOOM, supra note 45, 9–10; Holland, supra note 44, 17–18. 
47 BLOOM, supra note 45, 9–10; Holland, supra note 44, 17–18. 
48 Holland, supra note 44, 17–18. 
49 See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 996–97 
(1978); see also David H. Freedman, Is Management Still a Science?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (1999), 
https://hbr.org/1992/11/is-management-still-a-science. 
50 See Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the 
Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 595, 604 (2013); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube. 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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Consequently, the Constitution, and the Judiciary's interaction with it, re-
flects a complex system via CAB and SOP.51 
C. Analyzing Constitutional Interpretation Using Complex Systems Theory  
Based on the above analysis, our understanding of the Constitution is 
helped by identifying the structural factors or principles that inform the in-
terpretive enterprise.52 In this way, structural principles provide us with a 
way to analyze further the work of the courts using the complex systems 
model to observe which factors are at play in the interpretive calculus.53 For 
example, we can observe which principles courts choose to apply to facili-
tate the administration of justice within CAB and SOP.54 From this perspec-
tive, courts use the Constitution to derive law even though the text itself 
functions as both a meaning-maker and a meaning-receiver.55  
Here, complexity does not refer to the level of complication that under-
lies the systems analysis, but rather refers to the idea that “systems are 
composed of numerous interconnected components, or agents, dynamically 
interacting with one another, as well as with other external systems.”56 The 
Judiciary’s is just one agent within the constitutional system, but it affects 
the balance of power among the other Branches and the States.57 Complexi-
ty involves discrete actors interacting within the constitutional order.58 
Meanwhile, reductionism minimizes this complexity by focusing on the 
components as the primary means of generating an accurate explanation of 
constitutional meaning.59 Reductionism distorts the complexity of the sys-
tem.60 For example, a reductionist might concentrate exclusively on the Ju-
diciary’s discourse, but ignore its role within CAB and SOP more broadly.61 
In that way, system “‘behavior cannot be understood by decomposing the 
system into parts,’ because ‘the actions of any single part of the system can 
only be understood with reference to the entire system.’”62 
                                               
51 Crandall, supra note 50, at 604. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube. Co., 343 U.S. at 634–55. 
54 See Crandall, supra note 50; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube. Co., 343 U.S. at 634–55. 
55 Id. 
56See Crandall, supra note 50, at 609. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 604. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Crandall, supra note 50, at 604. 
62 Id.; see CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 42 (observing the role of philosophy and principles in jurispru-
dence can also be applied to the systemic distribution of power and justifications for a perpetual consti-
tutional order: “in the end, the principle that was thought to be most fundamental [by the courts], to rep-
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Additionally, complex systems analysis also adds value to the interpre-
tive enterprise by taking into account adaptability.63 In their nature, complex 
systems exhibit discernible patterns of adaptation.64 An agent within a com-
plex system gathers “information about its surroundings and its own behav-
ior.”65 This process enables agents to learn, evolve, adapt, or reorganize ac-
cording to the challenges that arise within the system.66 “Agents within 
systems, and even the systems themselves, constantly trend toward what 
theorists term self-organization,” Crandall explains.67 As Lars Skyttner ob-
serves, self-organization  “may be regarded as a theory about the way cha-
otic systems organize themselves and attain order. [For example] . . . chang-
ing technological development, changing lifestyles and preferences, [and] 
immigration” law reflect different notions of systemic organization.68 The 
courts have therefore developed several adaptive judicial mechanisms, such 
as balancing tests, adhering to precedent, and relying on first-principles.69 
The Judiciary's ability to self-organize puts forth jurisprudence designed to 
order, secure, and stabilize the polity within constitutional law.70 
                                                                                                             
resent the larger and deeper social interests, put its competitors to flight.”). 
63 Crandall, supra note 50, at 606. 
64 Id.; see generally Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic 
National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 611 (2001) (The “separation of powers scheme created by 
the Founders established an institutional interdependence among the branches that allows for the possi-
bility that the Court might be a protector of the rules of the game without producing a substantial coun-
ter-majoritarian effect. This institutional structure anticipates the possibility of differences in prefer-
ences, thereby producing a check on elected officials, but also creates institutional incentives to diminish 
the antidemocratic effects of those differences.”). 
65 THE MIND, THE BRAIN & COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 12 (Harold Morowitz & Jerome Singer eds., 
1995).  
66 See Brian T. Goldman, The Switch in Time That Saved Nine: A Study of Justice Owen Roberts’s Vote 
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, C. UNDERGRADUATE RES. ELEC. J. (2012), 
http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/150 (analyzing and illustrating the notion of system agents’ adaptive 
learning).  
67 Crandall, supra note 50, at 642; see Kai E. Lehmann, Crisis Foreign Policy as a Process of Self-
Organization, 24 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 27–42 (2011). 
68 LARS SKYTTNER, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVE, PRACTICE 296, 297–300 
(2d ed. 2006).  
69 See D.C. v. Heller, 552 U.S. 570, 589–620 (2008) (illustrating the reliance on first-principles of law, 
here the Second Amendment, to strike down a municipal ban on handguns as violating the second 
amendment, and therefore interpreting the amendment as the drafters of the Constitution had intended, 
securing an “individual right to bear arms for defensive purposes.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (illustrating the use of stare decisis to uphold past precedent as still controlling, there-
fore rejecting to overrule established precedent); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (illustrating 
the use of a balancing test as a judicial mechanism to organize a complex judicial standard). 
70 See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) (discussing the de-
bate of how to interpret the Constitution through a positivist framework, specifically focusing on 
originalism); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINNESOTA L. REV. 
1173 (2005) (discussing the relationship between the rule of law and the doctrine of stare decisis); Pat-
rick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585 (1988) (discussing the judicial mechanism 
of balancing tests including its origin, how they work, why they became so popular, and an evaluation of 
their use); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal 
12
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At the systems level, the Judiciary plays a cardinal role in defining and 
contextualizing constitutional order.71 In so doing, the courts both impact 
and are impacted by multi-dimensional layers of legal, sociopolitical, and 
economic sub-systems (e.g., commerce, national security, criminal justice, 
welfare, property, and international law).72 The courts’ adaptability, then, 
reflects a deep philosophical and historical commitment to CAB and SOP 
as each provides the foundation for the interpretive enterprise.73 When con-
sidering the systemic nature of CAB and SOP, Justice Holmes’ observation 
in N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner that, “a page of history is worth a volume of log-
ic,” readily applies.74 The wealth of information that judges employ to adju-
dicate constitutional issues, such as precedent, balancing tests, and other 
principles, can be located within the firmament of CAB and SOP, and cre-
ate a pervasive conceptual “complex bundle” that “loom[s] above all oth-
ers."75 The philosophical and historical bases of the Constitution enshrine 
CAB and SOP, and the Judiciary incorporates these into its meaning-
making and policymaking enterprises.76 The Founders subscribed to the no-
tion that  
                                                                                                             
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 J. OF CONST. L. 155 (2006) (discussing the role 
of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication and what it means for originalists and the future of unenu-
merated rights). 
71 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 48 (On the load-bearing constitutional structures of checks and balances 
and separation of powers, Cardozo writes, “These fundamental conceptions once attained form the start-
ing point from which are derived new consequences, which, at first tentative and groping, gain by reiter-
ation a new permanence and certainty. In the end, they become accepted themselves as fundamental and 
axiomatic.”). 
72 See id. at 51–66; Crandall, supra note 50, 608–611; Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and 
Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 276–278 (1986); Robert C. Tucker, Culture, Political Culture, and Com-
munist Society, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 175–176 (1973). 
73 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 55 (writing that these fundamental provisions “have come to us from with-
out not from within, that they embody the thought, not so much of the present as of the past, that sepa-
rated from their past their form and meaning are unintelligible and arbitrary, and hence that their devel-
opment, in order to be truly logical, must be mindful of their origins.”); see also Tucker, supra note 72, 
at 173–190. 
74 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
75 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2076 (2016) (“Under its commerce power, this 
Court has held, Congress may regulate, among other things, activities that have a substantial aggregate 
effect on interstate commerce."); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–22 (2005) (holding so long as those 
activities are economic in nature, one such “class of activities” is the production, possession, and distri-
bution of controlled substances. Grafting the holding in Raich onto the Hobbs Act’s commerce element, 
it follows that a robber who affects even the intrastate sale of marijuana affects commerce over which 
the United States has jurisdiction.”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124–125 (1942) (including “purely local activities that are part of an economic 
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce”); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935 was constitutional); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–275 (1918) (finding that federal 
regulation of child labor in purely internal (within a state) manufacturing, the products of which will not 
enter interstate commerce, to be beyond the power of Congress to regulate); CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 
65.  
76 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 17–28, 65. 
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the best legislators of all ages agree in this, that the absolute power, which orig-
inally is in the whole body, is a trust too great to be committed to any man or 
assembly; and therefore . . . it will be an eternal rule in politics among every 
free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state 
within itself. . . . [T]he best government is that which consists of three forms, 
regis [King], optimatium et populi imperitum [nobles, people]. . . . It is mani-
fest that the best form of government is that which is compounded of all three. 
This is founded not only in reason, but in experience.77 
 
The nature of the judicial process and Constitutional interpretation, thus, 
reflects a systemic policymaking paradigm that encapsulates the systems' 
agents (i.e., the Judiciary, Legislature, and Executive) and their relationship 
to the overarching constitutional order.78  
Because public policy must align with the Constitution, CAB and SOP 
impact the form and substance of judicial policymaking.79 For example, 
constitutional jurisprudence is permeated with generalities (e.g., fundamen-
tal rights or due process of law) to ensure broad and uniform application.80 
This application requires the courts to work according to the core principles 
of the Constitution, like CAB and SOP.81 As noted in Green v. Frazier, 
“What is meant by due process of law this court has had frequent occasion 
to consider, and has always declined to give a precise meaning, preferring 
to leave its scope to judicial decisions when cases from time to time arise.”82 
In Twining v. New Jersey, the Court notes that the Judiciary “has never at-
tempted to define with precision the words ‘due process of law.’ . . . It is 
                                               
77 Gilbert Chinard, Polybius and the American Constitution, 1 J. OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 42–44 
(1940) (observing that the “vice of kingly government is monarchy; that of aristocracy, oligarchy; that of 
democracy, rage and violence; into which, in process of time, all of them must degenerate. Lycurgus, to 
avoid these inconveniences, formed his government not of one sort, but united in one all the advantages 
and properties of the best governments; to the end that no branch of it, by swelling beyond its due 
bounds, might degenerate into the vice which is congenial to it; and that, while each of them were mutu-
ally acted upon by opposite powers, no one part might incline any way, or outweigh the rest; but that the 
commonwealth being equally poised and balanced, like a ship ‘or a wagon,’ acted upon by contrary 
powers, might long remain in the same situation; while the king was restrained from excess by the fear 
of the people, who had a proper share in the commonwealth; and, on the other side, the people did not 
dare to disregard the king, from their fear of the senate, who, being all elected for their virtue, would 
always incline to the justest side; by which means, that branch which happened to be oppressed became 
always superior, and, by the accessional weight of the senate, outbalanced the other."); see also Swidler, 
supra note 72, at 273–286, 276–277; GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND 
UNDERSTANDING (1971). 
78 See CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 17, 28, 65; see also Chinard, supra note 77, at 42–44; Crandall, supra 
note 50, at 608–611. 
79 Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. at 340 (holding public policy of the government is found in 
its statutes, therefore public policy must conform to the Constitution because statutes must also conform 
to the Constitution). 
80 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
81 See id. 
82 Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920). 
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sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which 
inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union 
may disregard.”83 Fundamentally, CAB and SOP are immutable principles 
that structure the complex system in which the Constitution operates.84 Up-
on this foundation, the courts' role, therefore, serves as a systemic “para-
mount public policy, one that will prevail over temporary inconvenience or 
occasional hardship, not lightly to sacrifice certainty and uniformity and or-
der and coherence.”85  
II. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING & ACTIVISM WITHIN A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
 A. Judiciary as Policymakers 
Federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, continue to be-
stride the nebulous area between political and apolitical institutions.86 The 
Court is  
a political institution, an institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on 
controversial questions of national policy. As a political institution, the Court is 
highly unusual, not least because Americans are not quite willing to accept the 
fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it; so that 
frequently we take both positions at once.87  
 
Generally speaking, debate has coalesced around two broad views when 
analyzing the courts as a policymaker.88 The first view argues that federal 
courts should have “an important and active role in national policy mak-
ing,” in order to provide “the vindication of the constitutional rights of de-
prived and downtrodden groups and the representation of the politically 
weak in the political system as well as the checking of the excesses of the 
elective branches of government.”89 The second view contends that the 
courts are “ineffectual in the formulation of national policies and cautions 
                                               
83 Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 101–02 (1908). 
84 See Epstein et al., supra note 64. 
85 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 67. 
86 See Michael Combs, The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker: A Historical-Legal Analysis of 
School Desegregation, 8 S. U. L. REV. 197 (1981). 
87 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 
50 EMORY L. J. 563 (2001); see also Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judi-
cial Politics: A Look Back, a Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000). 
88 See Combs, supra note 86. 
89 Id. at 197–198; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)) 
(“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to 
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”). 
15
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against the Supreme Court assuming a prominent and active role in national 
policy-making.”90 Additionally, “When the Court does seek to play a major 
role in national policy formulation,” it is “usurping the prerogatives of the 
elective branches of government and . . . is outside of its area of compe-
tence.”91 The Judiciary's role of maintaining CAB and SOP, thus, merits 
reexamination in light of the Trump Administration’s agenda to dismantle 
the administrative state and ignore the courts as independent and legitimate 
actors on the political and policy stages.92  
As Andrew Siegel notes, “legal academics have done a poor job ac-
knowledging, let alone analyzing, many of the specific practices, arrange-
ments, and habits of thought that shape the content of constitutional law in 
early twenty-first-century America.”93 Part of the problem is that there re-
mains a persistent aversion to characterizing judicial interpretation and 
opinions as a form of policymaking.94 However, “judicial judgments, and 
certainly those that changed existing rules are, in fact, expressions of public 
policy.”95 Policymaking functions on several different planes as it reflects 
values, goals, interests, politics, history, and culture.96 At the same time, 
philosophically and conceptually, policy reflects the purpose and meaning 
of being a member of a political unit and forming a political identity.97 As 
such, public policy is not “the rules of governance for our society but [ra-
ther it is] the ambience within which those rules are to be made.”98 Here, 
“ambience” is the complex system upon which the constitutional order is 
based, within which the courts are situated, and which breathes life into the 
courts.99 From this perspective, policymaking is less a question of, for ex-
ample, whether abortion is “right” or “wrong,” or if corporations should be 
afforded speech rights, or if marijuana should be subject to federal classifi-
cation and regulation, but more of an affirmation of the courts' power to 
                                               
90 Combs, supra note 86, at 197. 
91 Id. at 197–198. 
92 See Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1903) (“While the courts must exercise a judgment of their 
own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it exces-
sive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree. 
Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view, as well as for possible peculiar conditions 
which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of embodying only 
relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, 
would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means are 
held semper ubique et ab omnibus.”). 
93 Andrew M. Siegel, Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Culture, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1069 (2016). 
94 See Kurland, supra note 27. 
95 See id. at 185. 
96 See EUGENE BARDACH & ERIC M. PATASHNIK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (5th ed. 
2016). 
97 See id. at 9. 
98 Kurland, supra note 27, at 190. 
99 Id. 
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ballast the constitutional order. As Justice Frankfurter observed, “A court is 
confined within the bounds of a particular record. Only fragments of a so-
cial problem are seen through the narrow windows of a litigation.”100 
Policymaking embodies identity formation while it preserves, enhances, 
or augments the power to classify and define legal and political actuality. 
As the structural ambience that anchors the constitutional order, policymak-
ing also dismantles identity as it reconfigures social functions and redefines 
social welfare.101 Some of the Supreme Court’s “landmark cases” illustrate 
this point, such as: Shelley v. Kraemer,102 Brown v. Board of Education,103 
Roe v. Wade,104 Miranda v. Arizona,105 Hernandez v. Texas,106 and Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.107 These cases and others demon-
strate how the Court’s interpretations constitute policymaking from a sys-
tems perspective.108 Ignoring the systemic policymaking role of the courts 
treats “constitutional practices as aspects of an underlying constitutional 
‘structure’ . . . [and] makes them appear to be permanent, timeless, inherent 
features of American constitutionalism.”109 This apolitical, de-contextualized 
approach to constitutional interpretation feeds the illusion that the courts 
possess knowledge based on a form of objective legal reasoning that is di-
vorced from the Judiciary's powerful political and pragmatic policy-based 
reasoning.110 Subsequently, interpretations avoid being classified as policy, 
                                               
100 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 344, 365–366 (1948); see, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 1. 
101 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the prosecution of a conspiracy in federal 
court under federal law when that same conspiracy has already resulted in a conviction in state court 
under state law); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (holding that a defendant can be acquitted of a 
federal crime and convicted of a state crime, even if those crimes share the same evidence, without vio-
lating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which enabled state and federal prosecu-
tions for substantially similar events).  
102 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding courts may not enforce restrictive racial cove-
nants for real estate). 
103 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregating schools by race violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
104 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional laws that restrict a woman’s right to 
an abortion prior to fetal viability). 
105 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding police must advise criminal suspects of their 
rights under the Constitution to remain silent, consult an attorney, and have legal representation appoint-
ed if indigent). 
106 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that trying a defendant particular race or eth-
nicity in front of a jury where all persons of his race or ethnicity have been excluded by the state violates 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
107 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding political campaign con-
tributions by corporations and labor unions constitute speech protected by the Constitution). 
108 See Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793 
(1957); see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vegelahn v. 
Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
109 Siegel, supra note 93, at 1070. 
110 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103–04 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing how the develop-
17
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which, as this article argues, is what they are when viewed systemically.111 
As Justice Jackson observes, “Nearly every significant decision of the Su-
preme Court has to do with power—power of government, power of offi-
cials—and hence it is always concerned with the social and economic inter-
ests involved in the allocation, denial, or recognition of power.”112  
Incidentally, despite its immense policymaking power, the judiciary rare-
ly relies upon public policy as an explicit reason for its constitutional inter-
pretations.113 It is not enough to say simply that ‘public policy’ justifies the 
result. There are a thousand different public policies of variant strengths 
that might be asserted. The specific policy  must be identified and its rele-
vancy made clear. Simply stated, neither precedent nor policy genuinely 
justifies a result except as its own basis affords the justification.114 Judicial 
tools for interpretation, such as textualism, original intent, history, and bal-
ancing tests, can be viewed as both products and producers of the complex 
system that informs the judicial process.115 Phillip Bobbitt’s taxonomy on 
the “proper” modalities that interpretation, theory, and law can “legitimate-
ly” draw upon (i.e., history, text, structure, doctrine, ethos, and prudence) 
provides a vivid example of how politically, socially, and ideologically 
based interpretations are part of an overarching system that is greater than 
the sum of its parts.116 But these modalities do not function in a vacuum: 
these modalities are all part of a system.117   
As a complex system, the Constitution as a blueprint for political order 
influences judicial interpretation, which creates policies that promote cogni-
tive maps to orientate a legal subject.118 In turn, this grants the legal subject 
possibilities of thought and action so that it can develop an identity and be 
emplaced in legal actuality.119 The deployment of cognitive maps through 
constitutional interpretation establishes what Michael Shapiro has termed 
                                                                                                             
ment of law is innately contextual). 
111 See ROBERT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 315–16 (1941). 
112 Id. at xii; see also ROBERT J. MCKEEVER, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: A POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2016). 
113 See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 721, 723 (1979). 
114 Id.; see also Missouri, Kansas, & Texas. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (discussing the 
importance of administering constitutional provisions with caution); Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby 
Movement, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 158-60 (2014); MELANI MCALISTER, EPIC ENCOUNTERS: CULTURE, 
MEDIA, & U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-2000 4 (Earl Lewis et. al. eds., 2001). 
115 See generally Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592 (discussing how checks and balances and the sepa-
ration of powers, as systemic variables, embody as well as contour the policymaking capacity of the 
federal courts, and the Court in particular). 
116 See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 696 (1980). 
117 See Vicente Abad Santos, The Role of the Judiciary in Policy Formulation, 41 PHIL. L. J. 567, 573 
(1966). 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
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“moral geographies.”120 Moral geographies are “cultural and social practices 
that work together to mark not only states but also regions, cultural group-
ings, and ethnic or racial territories. Moral geographies shape human under-
standing of the world. . . . Different moral geographies can coexist and even 
compete.”121 Constitutional interpretation provides moral geographies in re-
lation to the law. The Court’s interpretation of the Constitution—from 
Bowers v. Hardwick122 to Obergefell v. Hodges,123 for instance—is a manner 
of concretizing moral geographies for comprehending legal actuality.124 As 
policy, interpretations of the Constitution retain high degrees of continuity, 
but also can accommodate changes.125 For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
the Court's establishment of “separate but equal” doctrine directly contrib-
uted to a national policy of a white-nationalist morality and racial superiori-
ty preserved via segregation.126 However, the Court later rejected this via de-
segregation as national policy in Brown v. Board of Education.127  
As policy, judicial opinions are part of “an interlocking system of prac-
tices, institutional arrangements, norms, and habits of thought that deter-
mine what questions we ask, what arguments we credit, how we process 
disputes, and how we resolve those disputes.”128 The practices identified by 
Bobbitt above, for instance, inform the cognitive maps that courts employ 
and policymakers confront when engaging the constitutional text and its in-
terpretations.129 In light of the forgoing discussion and analysis, complex 
                                               
120 Michael J. Shapiro, Moral Geographies and the Ethics of Post-Sovereignty, 6 PUB. CULTURE 479, 
482 (1994). 
121 MCALISTER, supra note 114. 
122 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding a 
state constitutional amendment that denies equal protection of the laws to homosexuals is a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(holding state law that criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual conduct violates right to privacy under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors because of 
sexual orientation violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
123 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
124 Kurland, supra note 27, at 197; see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Mapp, 367 U.S. 
at 643. 
125 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“Even if 
there is no negligence. . .public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent to defective products that reach the market.”). 
126 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Berea 
Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
127 Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
128 Siegel, supra note 93, at 1107. 
129 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L. J. 657, 678 (2009); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 
546-48 (2006); Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L. J. 1195, 1203 
(2009); Michael J. Shapiro, On Pictures, Paintings, Power and the Political Philosophy of International 
Rights, THEORY TALKS (2009), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155097/Theory%20Talk36_Shapiro.pdf. 
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systems analysis, thus, provides a theoretical lens to better explain court 
power, because it highlights the Judiciary's policymaking power in the con-
text of CAB and SOP while considering the current political climate 
through adaptability.130 
Accordingly, the myth of the apolitical Judiciary needs reassessment, es-
pecially given the demands being placed on the courts to counter what 
many commentators feel are direct attacks by the Executive on the integrity 
of CAB and SOP as envisioned in the Constitution.131 Plus, this analysis, 
which counters the myth of the apolitical and reactionary as opposed to 
proactive policymaker, conceptualizes judicial policymaking as a systemic 
mandate geared toward preserving the integrity of the constitutional order 
via CAB and SOP.132 As Nutting explains, “If we include in the term ‘poli-
cy’ the views of the justices as to the social, political or economic desirabil-
ity of a given course of action, it is clear that the [C]ourt has always made 
policy in some types of cases.”133 Justice Holmes acknowledges the Court’s 
policymaking power stating, “I recognize without hesitation that judges do 
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined 
from molar to molecular motions.”134 In sum, an candid appraisal or declara-
tion of judicial power based on complex systems analysis may help to coun-
ter attacks on the integrity of the judiciary from the present Executive’s pol-
icies that threaten to undermine the integrity of CAB and SOP.135  
B. Judicial Activism as Policymaking 
Judicial activism can be re-conceptualized as a facet of systemic consti-
tutional order that acknowledges the Judiciary as a check and balance in the 
overarching political system, and not merely a passive bystander.136 The fear 
of concentrated power in any one branch of government is an essential 
theme throughout the Constitution.137 As James Madison notes, “The accu-
mulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judicia[l] in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
                                               
130 Greene, supra note 129, at 678; see e.g., Holland, supra note 18; Wolfram, supra note 31. 
131 See, e.g., Jonathan Bernstein, A Lawless Presidency Isn't Without Its Risks, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jul. 
26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-26/a-lawless-presidency-isn-t-without-its-
risks. 
132 Holland, supra note 18, at 1; Wolfram, supra note 31. 
133 Nutting, supra note 20, at 60. 
134 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 2015, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
135 Bernstein, supra note 131; Holland, supra note 18, at 1; Wolfram, supra note 31. 
136 CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 23 (“The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end 
be guided by like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits 
of his competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He 
fills the open spaces in the law.”). 
137 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. at art. II, § 1; id. at art. III, § 1. 
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appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny.”138 However, if policymaking, which the Constitution largely reserves 
for the Legislative and Executive Branches, is tied directly to the courts act-
ing to preserve CAB and SOP, then the courts may assert their legitimate 
role in the policymaking process.139 Judicial review of Executive and Legis-
lative pronouncements and the courts’ ability to set and revisit precedent are 
examples of the judiciary’s role in the systemic administration of justice via 
CAB and SOP.140 Ultimately, as Spann explains, “the distinction between 
constitutional law and ordinary politics becomes untenable. Once scruti-
nized, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence appears not only to 
consist largely of political policy preferences but also to consist largely of 
the political policy preferences that are favored by a majority of the 
Court.”141  
Despite being constitutional gatekeepers, the Judiciary’s policies must 
still contend with being balanced and checked by the other branches of gov-
ernment.142 Cardozo observes, “The judge, even when he is free, is still not 
wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant 
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness he is to 
draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.”143  In developing its con-
stitutional jurisprudence, the Court notes the tension between the separation 
of powers and how it competes with the Court's role as an enforcer checks 
and balances.144 Focusing on the overarching system within which the Judi-
ciary functions illuminates its policymaking character by going beyond spe-
cific social and ideologically-based polices, and instead highlighting the 
structural norms, values, and ordering principles that the courts are reifying. 
“The Founders’ formation of coequal branches of government—the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial—equal in their responsibilities under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States and in their accountability to the 
American people, is the rock upon which the world's longest-standing de-
mocracy rests.”145 Thus, CAB and SOP are intricately woven into the consti-
tutional system and are the principles that contextualize the administration 
of justice. 
                                               
138 The Federalist Nos. 10, 47, 51 (James Madison). 
139 Kurland, supra note 27, at 183–84, 186, 188–89. 
140 Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592. 
141 Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 709, 710 (2005). 
142 Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592. 
143 Cardozo, supra note 5, at 141. 
144 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that when the 
Court acts as policymaker, “at the expense of the legislature,” then the Court exercises “ultimate power 
over public policy in fields where no specific provision of the constitution limits legislative power.”). 
145 Dennis C. Hayes, Checks and Balances, 96 Judicature 148 (2013). 
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When the courts promulgate social welfare policy, such as establishing 
or undermining abortion rights,146 or bolstering corporate speech rights,147 
they still rely on the larger constitutional “ambience” to justify and legiti-
mize their enterprise.148 At the systems level, the process by which the courts 
infuse the Constitution with social issues—and vice versa—can be viewed 
as being informed by and reifying CAB and SOP.149 The courts “choose 
among controversial alternatives of public policy by appealing to at least 
some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value that cannot be 
found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution. It is in this 
sense that the Court is a national policy-maker.”150 CAB and SOP inform 
criteria of acceptable policymaking by the courts, because these principles 
are vital to the preservation of the constitutional order.151   
III.  JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING WITHIN THE THREE-BRANCH SYSTEM  
A. Ordering Principles and the Constitutional Super-Structure 
In a complex system, court-constructed standards, tests, principles, cul-
ture, and politics play a significant role in how interpretation is conducted 
and the resultant policy that emerges in the form of opinions.152 Opinions, as 
expression of public policy (e.g., gay marriage,153 corporate personhood,154 
free speech,155 and religious freedom156), are built upon the structural princi-
ples that inform the constitutional order. The constitutional system is a 
product of the three principal agents, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
Branches, and their interaction. Subsequently, each influences the others’ 
perceptions, interests, and conduct within the system.157 The Judiciary func-
tions within a system that “is not only ‘complex’ in a descriptive sense but a 
                                               
146 Spann, supra note 141, at 727–28. 
147 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771 (1978). 
148 See Spann, supra note 141, at 710. 
149 See id. at 715. 
150 Dahl, supra note 87, at 565. 
151 See Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592. 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding that the fact of re-
spondent’s forcible abduction by U.S. government agents did not prohibit being put on trial in federal 
court for violations of U.S. criminal laws). See also Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (finding 
that a fugitive kidnapped from abroad could not claim any violation of the U.S. Constitution, laws, or 
treaties). 
153 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2584. 
154 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
155 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
156 See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010). 
157 See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 9–10 
(2002). 
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‘complex adaptive system’ . . . defined . . . as ‘a collection of semi-
autonomous agents with the freedom to act in unpredictable ways and 
whose interactions over time and space generate system-wide patterns.’”158 
The present constitutional order is the product of complex, integrative con-
duct that connects the individual agents.159 The degree of connectivity is 
based upon the nature and intensity of interaction among the agents based 
upon overarching ordering principles that guide relations and conduct.160 
Each Branch “learns” from interaction because the degree of sophistication 
and complexity that supports the constitutional order.161   
As such, the Judiciary wove CAB and SOP into its jurisprudence and in-
to the structure of constitutional order early on and throughout its history.162 
For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court expounds upon constitu-
tional meaning using the text and structure of the Constitution while look-
ing beyond the text to clarify more than just the power of Congress to estab-
lish a bank and Maryland’s inability to tax it.163 The Court relies on CAB 
and SOP to find in favor of the federal government and to pursue a pro-
federal power agenda, which is a policy that emanates from the bench dur-
ing Chief Justice Marshall’s tenure.164 The Court’s “opinion read the words 
‘necessary and proper’ to mean not required and authorized but only rea-
sonable and relevant, i.e., necessary = reasonable, proper = relevant: a more 
potent formula than E=mc2.”165 Examples of modern iterations of the Court’s 
policy of bolstering the constitutional order via CAB and SOP include INS 
v. Chadha,166 Bowsher v. Synar,167 and Mistretta v. United States.168 
                                               
158 Lehmann, supra note 67, at 504. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Twelve Steps to Restore Checks and Balances in Democracy & Justice, in 
COLLECTED WRITINGS 84 (Brennan Ctr. for Just., 2008). 
162 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Marbury, 
5 U.S. at 137; see also Spann, supra note 141, at 719. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 
(2004) (invalidating the Child Online Protection Act on First Amendment grounds); Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (protecting nude dancing under the First Amendment); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (ruling flag burning is protected speech under the First Amendment); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) (holding the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment permits racially disparate impact not directly caused by intentional discrimination); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of capital punishment); Keyes v. 
Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (reaffirming prohibition on use of race conscious remedies to 
eliminate de facto segregation); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment 
of Japanese-Americans); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (upholding denial of women's right to 
vote); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (reaffirming the constitutionality of slavery); Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (divesting indigenous Americans of titles to land). 
163 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316. 
164 Id. 
165 Kurland, supra note 27, at 184. 
166 Immigr. & Natrualization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (striking down the legislative 
veto mechanism as a violation of separation of powers). 
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Though this article establishes that the Judiciary holds policymaking 
power, it has yet to ask if courts should embrace and exercise that power. 
The Court has, perhaps unsuccessfully, tried to answer the question:  
A judgment as to when the evil of a decisional error exceeds the evil of 
an innovation must be based on very practical and in part upon policy con-
siderations. When, as in this problem, such practical and political judgments 
can be made by the political branches of the government, it is the part of 
wisdom and self-restraint and good government for courts to leave the initi-
ative to Congress.169 
In constitutional interpretation, the Judiciary may find itself pondering 
the fitness of a particular executive order or piece of legislation, and wheth-
er or not and/or how to appraise the validity and desirability of said legal 
pronouncement: 
Policy must inevitably be considered by the court where no other compelling 
bases of decisions are indicated. Just as laymen, when confronted by a novel 
problem will, and, indeed, must consider the matter in relation to what ‘ought’ 
to be, so judges, unless bound by precedent or subject to clear legislative direc-
tion, must take into account the "rightness" of the decision in terms of the so-
cial, political or economic ends sought to be advanced. Only to the extent that 
some external restriction which the judge deems himself bound to recognize 
exists is his freedom in this particular curtailed.170 
This formulation provides little in the form of concrete limitations, be-
cause a judge is able to exercise a high level of freedom to determine what 
is constraining, and, thus, engage in policymaking regarding interpretation 
of what is desirable.171 Viewing the Judiciary as part of a larger system in 
which it is countered, balanced, and checked by the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches helps situate the content and character of the courts’ power to 
manipulate CAB and SOP.172 In this way, systems analysis enhances the ap-
titude of one “to expand . . . understanding of [the constitutional system’s] 
behavior and properties.”173 Court opinions are interpretations that seek to 
                                                                                                             
167 Bowsher v. Synar, 462 U.S. 714, 732–36 (1986) (striking down the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act as an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power by Congress). 
168 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the federal sentencing guidelines 
against several separation of powers challenges). 
169 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 594 (1944). 
170 Nutting, supra note 20, at 66. 
171 See, e.g., Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 533; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235–37 
(1941); Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 313 U.S. 177 (1941); United States v. Local 
807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). 
172 See J. B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 904 (2008) (“A system may 
be stable and predictable over some relevant time frame and scale, but it is never entirely static, and 
small changes in one condition can lead over time to large changes in another condition.”). 
173 Id. at 888. 
24
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4
Do Not Delete 4/29/18  8:45 AM 
2018] NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 287 
provide answers that are “part of a much larger network or system of ques-
tions and answers and further questions instead of being merely discrete 
self-contained units of information.”174 As mentioned, behavior within any 
system does not take place in a vacuum, and in the case of constitutional in-
terpretation, systemic factors, like CAB and SOP, arise from the interaction 
of the individual parts.175  
For the Judiciary and from a systems perspective, policy not only reflects 
the values, norms, content and character of the interpreter, but also more 
importantly reflects the political and legal super-structure that informs poli-
cymaking.176 “The behavior of the system as a whole can never be under-
stood by mechanistically adding together its component parts . . . the econ-
omy and society . . . are more than the sum of the individuals who inhabit 
it.”177 This is especially true when considering the Judiciary's function and 
the function of its opinions within the system.178 In Warth v. Seldin, the 
Court states, “In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular is-
sues. This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal court 
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions, it 
is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the 
courts in a democratic society.”179 By considering the function of the Judici-
ary within a complex system, we see that it serves the overarching needs 
and values of the constitutional order as a whole.180 Thus, by identifying 
systemic factors and actors, one is better able to study the Constitution and 
its impact on law and society. In turn, this understanding impacts the form 
and substance of constitutional interpretation and identifies overarching pat-
                                               
174 DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, OBLIVION: STORIES 131 (2004). 
175 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (finding the Line Item Veto Act of 
1996 unconstitutionally delegated power to the Executive to unilaterally amend or repeal parts of stat-
utes passed by Congress); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (finding Congress may 
not retroactively require the federal courts to reopen final judgments, because it violates separation of 
powers); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel statute 
against separation of powers challenges); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 
(1986) (finding an administrative agency may, in some cases, exert jurisdiction over state law counter-
claims). 
176 Spann, supra note 145, at 746–47 (“[The] normative values and political preferences are constitution-
alized through Supreme Court opinions that purport to demonstrate how the Court's outcomes flow logi-
cally from the language, structure, and original intent of the Constitution.”). 
177 PAUL ORMEROD, BUTTERLY ECONOMICS: A NEW GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR X (2000). 
178 Leflar, supra note 113, at 736–37. 
179 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (discussing the issue of standing and the proper role of the 
courts in hearing cases and controversies).  
180 See id. at 517–18 (discussing the “threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention”). 
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terns that emerge when considering the systemic nature of the Constitu-
tion.181  
B. The Impact of the Executive & Legislature on the Judiciary 
A systems view also enables one to better assess the many factors that in-
form constitutional interpretation and how a judicial opinion will be im-
pacted by and impact the systemic realities of the polity. From this perspec-
tive, the  
rule of checks and balances inherent in the system of separation of powers pro-
vides Justices (and all other governmental actors) with separate actions of the 
branches of government but from the interaction among them. Thus, it follows 
that for any set of actors to make authoritative policy be they Justices, legisla-
tors, or executives—they must take into account this institutional constraint by 
formulating expectations about the preferences of the other relevant actors and 
what they expect them to do when making their own choices.182  
 
What is more, in 
[in] the social world . . . causation is complex. Outcomes are determined not by 
single causes but by multiple causes, and the causes may, and usually do, inter-
act, in a non-additive fashion . . . the combined effect is not necessarily the sum 
of the separate effects. . . . complex causes can [thus] easily generate chaotic 
outcomes.183  
In this way, judicial interpretation is comprised of manifold layers of 
networked systems of knowledge and understanding that inform policy 
formulation and implementation based on the courts’ interpretation of the 
Constitution.  
In Allen v. Wright, for instance, the plaintiffs, parents of African-
American children in seven states where public schools had recently been 
                                               
181 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (“In order to lay a due foundation for that sepa-
rate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on 
all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a 
will of its own. . . .It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little depend-
ent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive 
magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in eve-
ry other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the neces-
sary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for 
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must 
be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights 
of the place.”). 
182 Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 593–94. 
183 BYRNE, supra note 35, at 20 (1998); see also Fritjof Capra, Complexity and Life, EMERGENCE 15, 21–
23 (June 1, 2002) (discussing “chaos theory”). 
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desegregated, brought a class action suit against the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS") contending that its guidelines and procedures for determining 
whether private schools were racially discriminatory, and subsequent denial 
of tax-exempt status to such schools, were insufficient.184 Plaintiffs con-
tended that the IRS standards used to determine discrimination were not ac-
curately identifying private school discrimination, and that white parents 
were able to send their children to private schools and deduct charitable 
contributions to the institution, thereby perpetuating segregated schools.185 
The Court determined that citizens do not have standing to sue a federal 
agency based only on the adverse effects that the agency’s determinations 
might have on third parties. The Court stated that,  
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why 
our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents’ alleged injury ‘fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action’ of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the 
way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government 
violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out 
their legal obligations. . . . ‘Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach 
would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom 
and soundness of Executive action; such a  role is appropriate for the Congress, 
acting through its committees and the 'power of the purse;' it is not the role  of 
the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting 
from unlawful governmental action.’186 
 
In Allen, the plaintiff’s sought to have the courts appreciate and act upon 
the socially discriminatory effects of IRS tax policy enabling what Justice 
Stevens alluded to as government policy subsidizing white-flight.187 He 
wrote, “In final analysis, the wrong respondents allege that the Government 
has committed is to subsidize the exodus of white children from schools 
that would otherwise be racially integrated.”188 The Court chose systemic 
principles embodied in CAB and SOP over competing, social policy-
motivated ones to decide the case at hand.189  
Within the system, the Judiciary will, generally speaking, uphold CAB 
and SOP over competing norms, values, and ordering principles.190 While 
this may not be something that is embraced explicitly by the Judiciary, it is 
                                               
184 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
185 Id. at 783–84 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
186 Id. at 759–60. 
187 See id. at 784 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
188 Id. 
189 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (“We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without run-
ning afoul of that structural principle.”). 
190 See id. at 760 (1984) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 
(1976)) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)). 
27
Astrada: The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017
Do Not Delete 4/29/18  8:45 AM 
290 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXI:iii 
present in the overarching constitutional order.191 For example,  
When the Constitution fixes the boundaries of the three departments in terms of 
their basic functions, it inevitably locates in the judiciary the authority to assert 
itself as the guardian of the principle of the separation of powers. . . . Its judg-
ment affects the balance between the executive and legislative branches and 
generally defines the conditions under which they must operate in relation to 
the Constitution as viewed by the court.192  
Thus, opinions become “discrete, chronological series of moments” that 
establish a corpus of truth based on knowledge that the courts apply and ob-
tain through the interpretive process.193 In addition, the power of judicial re-
view functions as a form of policymaking even if that power is specifically 
premised on cabining the power aspirations of the competing branches.194 
The “power of judicial review specifically to cabin each branch within its 
constitutional limits, lest each arrogate to itself more than its entitlement” is 
a form of policy that explicitly encapsulates the Judiciary's systemic policy 
function to preserve the system’s integrity via CAB and SOP.195  Thus, pre-
serving the integrity of the overarching constitutional system is a cardinal 
role that the courts assume in constitutional interpretation:  
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal 
Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, 
to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine 
itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each 
of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power even to accom-
plish desirable objectives must be  resisted. Although not ‘hermetically’ sealed 
from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally 
identifiable.196 
 
                                               
191 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). (“If, then, the courts of justice are to be consid-
ered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will 
afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so 
much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance 
of so arduous a duty. This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and 
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the in-
fluence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, 
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in 
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the mi-
nor party in the community.”); see also Alan Dershowitz, Courts Check and Balance Trump on Immi-
gration, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 9, 2017, 10:10 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Courts-check-and-
balance-Trump-on-immigration-481106. 
192 Santos, supra note 117, at 568. 
193 WALLACE, supra note 174, at 151. 
194 See Malcolm T. Dungan, The Supreme Court as a Court of Law, 6 J. PUB. L. 363 (1957). 
195 Kurland, supra note 27, at 189. 
196 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
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This system constitutes a bounded, complex, and rule-based space for the 
ordering of national political and legal affairs.197  
Ultimately, a complex systems approach to judicial interpretation inher-
ently involves the interaction of the Judiciary with the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches, as well as State governments and courts.198 For example, “It 
is within Congress’s power to overturn the interpretations the Court gives to 
statutory law but, according to the Supreme Court, it is not—at least not by 
a simple majority—within Congress’s power to overturn the Court's consti-
tutional decisions; Congress must propose a constitutional amendment.”199  
In Dickerson v. United States the Court declared that a constitutional deci-
sion of the Court cannot be overruled by an act of Congress.200 The Court 
enunciated CAB and SOP while clarifying its role in the constitutional or-
der finding that it 
has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority 
to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals. 
However, the power to judicially create and enforce non-constitutional ‘rules of 
procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a 
relevant Act of Congress.’  Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or 
set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not re-
quired by the Constitution. But Congress may not legislatively supersede our 
decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.201  
 
As such, within the complex constitutional system, the three Branches in-
teract and coevolve.202 Justice Holmes’ observations of the law in the 19th 
century readily apply in the 21st century. He writes,  
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessi-
ties of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public 
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with 
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in deter-
mining the rules by which men should be governed.203  
In general, a system is composed of regularly interacting parts that give 
rise to systemic activities. “The [Judiciary] is an essential part of the politi-
cal leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the most im-
portant of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of 
                                               
197 See id. at 942–44. 
198 Dahl, supra note 87, at 580–81. 
199 Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 596. 
200 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
201 Id. at 437. 
202 Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592. 
203 HOLMES, supra note 23, at 1. 
29
Astrada: The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017
Do Not Delete 4/29/18  8:45 AM 
292 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXI:iii 
the Constitution,”204 and demonstrates that a set of concepts, whether empir-
ical, metaphysical, or philosophical, works in tandem within an interde-
pendent set of organizational relationships.205  
As such, four general elements characterize the role of the Judiciary in 
the larger political, economic, and sociocultural system within which the 
constitutional order functions:  
First, there are the propositions or principles allegedly derived from constitu-
tional or statutory language; second, judicial precedents which, these days, are 
more likely to refer to lengthy obiter dicta rather than holdings in previous cas-
es; third, the practicalities of the situation which license or inhibit the scope of 
judicial adventurism; and finally, and not least, the personal predilections of 
each of the judges, for it must be understood that, in Hamiltonian terms, the ju-
diciary now exerts WILL as well as JUDGMENT if not yet FORCE. Each of 
the four elements, separately or in combination, may be subsumed under the 
rubric of public policy.206 
Constitutional interpretation is comprised of complex, interactive agents 
that provide the Judiciary with the potential to adapt and learn from eventu-
ation, because the constitutional order is not a collection of agents and 
components, but rather a system.207 The difference between a “collection” 
and a “system” (whose parts are comprised of multiple sub-systems), as ex-
plained by Bertalanffy, is “that in a collection the parts remain individually 
unchanged whether they are isolated or together . . . whereas in a system the 
parts necessarily become changed by their mutual association; hence, their 
whole becomes more than just the sum of the parts.”208 Focusing on fixed 
structures or aspects of constitutional interpretation, though indispensable to 
explaining and understanding constitutional law, is too narrow, because it 
posits a closed system with various laws that apply across the board.209 A 
systems analysis approach is better suited to explaining and understanding 
the judicial power, because it involves “a way of thinking having the pro-
portions of a world view . . . as opposed to singular principles or parts of a 
structure.”210  
                                               
204 Dahl, supra note 87, at 580. 
205 See generally Ervin Laszlo, A Holistic Vision for Our Time Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity, 
and the Human Sciences, in THE SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD (Hampton Press 1996); see also Ervin Laszlo, 
The Natural Philosophy of the New Developments in the Sciences, in THE SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 
(George Braziller ed., 1972). 
206 Kurland, supra note 27, at 187–88. 
207 See Charles McClelland, General Systems Theory in International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS & MODELS OF WORLD ORDER 21–22 (Richard B. Gray ed., 1969). 
208 LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, A SYSTEMS VIEW OF MAN ix (Westview Press 1981). 
209 See McClelland, supra note 207, at 22. 
210 See id. at 21. 
30
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4
Do Not Delete 4/29/18  8:45 AM 
2018] NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 293 
While constitutional interpretation may seem to take place in a closed 
system,211 it is a complex and open system that is in constant flux and com-
prised of various constituent ideational and material components.212 Consti-
tutional interpretation founded on CAB and SOP is a complex attribute of a 
system that networks the Judiciary into the larger policymaking apparatuses 
of the constitutional order.213 Fundamentally, processes “of complex organi-
zation have to be understood in evolutionary terms: they cannot be atomis-
tically reduced to, or deduced from, their components. The whole is bigger 
than the sum of the parts, a whole which becomes ever more diversified, 
qualitatively evolving towards greater complexity.”214  
CONCLUSION 
This article highlights the importance of viewing the judicial power from 
a systems perspective, which directly informs the nature of the judicial pro-
cess and the structure wherein the administration of justice takes place. In 
sum, system and structure matter when seeking to explain and understand 
judicial power, because both have an indelible effect on the nature of the 
judicial process and on the outcomes of the interpretive enterprise. From a 
complex systems perspective, judicial power reflects the political and philo-
sophical principle that “there can be no government of laws without a bal-
ance, and that there can be no balance without three orders [(Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial)]: and that even three orders can never balance 
each other, unless each in its department is independent and absolute.”215 
Thus, the Judiciary plays a key role in the administration of justice as envi-
                                               
211 See, e.g., Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979). 
212 See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 113, at 740 (“There is a traditional distinction, repeated by lawyers and 
laymen alike, between ‘legal reasoning’ and ‘political reasoning.’ The former is somehow supposed to 
be purer than the latter. Whether that is true depends upon the sense in which the word ‘political’ is 
used. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., Judge Andrews, in his famous dissent, said that the legal concept 
of proximate cause is one of ‘practical politics,’ by which he meant the realistic reconciliation of claims 
to justice in our society. He was not talking about backroom venality or the buying of votes, but he did 
include the arguments, pro and con, that lobbyists might employ in an effort to persuade legislators to 
vote their way on a proposed law. The same lobbyist arguments have their place in the briefs filed by 
counsel for the parties and by amici curiae, and in their oral arguments, when the new law is being 
urged upon an appellate court. They have their place there because they are the stuff that convinces the 
judges, or fails to convince them, in the same manner that lobbyists' arguments influence legislators. If 
ensuing judicial opinions are to state real reasons for results reached by judicial lawmakers, they must 
include the reasons of ‘practical politics’ that induced conviction, or else the opinions will be incomplete 
and false.”). 
213 See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 
Yale L.J. 71, 115 (1984).  
214 Ken Cole, Globalization: Understanding Complexity, Dev. Stud. 323, 352 (2003). 
215 Chinard, supra note 77, at 45; see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 579; Humphreys’ 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the constitutionality of independent agen-
cies). 
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sioned by the structural principles embedded in the Constitution, such as the 
separation of powers and checks and balances. In Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, the Court declared that the judiciary “has no will.”216 It con-
tinued, 
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no exist-
ence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. . . . Ju-
dicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the 
judge, always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, 
in other words, to the will of the law.217  
By employing a systems analysis, we can observe that this is not exactly 
the case, because the nature of the judicial process and the overarching con-
stitutional order are both impacted by the norms and values encapsulated in 
CAB and SOP.218 For instance, the courts are likely to exert leadership in 
national policymaking when a dominant coalition is weak or is unstable 
with respect to key policies. Likewise, the courts may participate in national 
policymaking within the narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the 
dominant coalition, or the may be most effective when they set policy for 
officials, agencies, state governments, or regions.219  
Systemically, the constitutional order’s prerogative is “to preserve the 
principle of checks and balances without which no form of government can 
attain any permanency.”220 CAB and SOP thus play a fundamental role in 
judicial interpretation, because each signifies or reflects “a body of beliefs 
that express the fundamental, largely unconscious or assumed political val-
ues of a society.”221 The nature of the judicial process leads to the production 
of knowledge and understanding that legitimates, maintains, enhances, and 
preserves the integrity of the overarching constitutional order.222 Systemic 
analysis is, therefore, germane to constitutional theory building, because, as 
Gaetano Mosca notes, “a person thinks, judges and believes the way a soci-
ety in which he lives thinks, judges and believes.”223 
                                               
216 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Combs, supra note 86, at 198–99.  
220 Chinard, supra note 77, at 45. 
221 John Calvert, The Mythic Foundations of Radical Islam, 48 ORBIS 29, 31 (2004). 
222 See CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 179. 
223 GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 26 (Hannah D. Kahn trans., 1939); McDougal & Lasswell, 
supra note 25, at 386 (“[T]he ‘public order’ decisions of a community may be described as those, 
emerging in continuous flow from the constitutive process, which shape and maintain the protected fea-
tures of the community's various value processes. These are the decisions which determine how re-
sources are allocated and developed, and wealth produced and distributed; how human rights are pro-
moted and protected or deprived; how enlightenment is encouraged or retarded; how health is fostered, 
or neglected; how rectitude and civil responsibility are matured; and so on through the whole gamut of 
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demanded values.”). 
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